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014.02.0Abstract Human factors are critical causes of modern aviation accidents. However, existing
accident analysis methods encounter limitations in addressing aviation human factors, especially
in complex accident scenarios. The existing graphic approaches are effective for describing accident
mechanisms within various categories of human factors, but cannot simultaneously describe inad-
equate human–aircraft–environment interactions and organizational deﬁciencies effectively, and
highly depend on analysts’ skills and experiences. Moreover, the existing methods do not emphasize
latent unsafe factors outside accidents. This paper focuses on the above three limitations and
proposes an integrated graphic–taxonomic–associative approach. A new graphic model named
accident tree (AcciTree), with a two-mode structure and a reaction-based concept, is developed
for accident modeling and safety defense identiﬁcation. The AcciTree model is then integrated with
the well-established human factors analysis and classiﬁcation system (HFACS) to enhance both
reliability of the graphic part and logicality of the taxonomic part for improving completeness of
analysis. An associative hazard analysis technique is further put forward to extend analysis to fac-
tors outside accidents, to form extended safety requirements for proactive accident prevention. Two
crash examples, a research ﬂight demonstrator by our team and an industrial unmanned aircraft,
illustrate that the integrated approach is effective for identifying more unsafe factors and safety
requirements.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Rapid development in technology has remarkably reduced
rates of aviation accidents attributable to aircraft failures; thus,
human factors, which have been implicated in 70%–80% of all
aviation accidents,1 become prominent in modern aviation
accidents.2–4 Among the research studying human factors in
aviation, accident and accident causation analysis remain
worldwide concerned themes.5 Two key problems on accident
causation analysis are: (a) how to identify unsafe factors fromSAA & BUAA. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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deﬁne and represent accident mechanisms, or relations, among
the unsafe factors.
In terms of unsafe factors, Edwards classiﬁed accident
causes by human individual, hardware, software, and environ-
ment in his software–hardware–environment–liveware (SHEL)
model.6 Hawkins further modiﬁed the SHEL model into
software–hardware–environment–liveware–liveware (SHELL)
model by introducing another liveware element.7 In the Dom-
ino model by Heinrich,8,9 the man-made disaster theory by
Turner,10 and the Swiss cheese model by Reason,11 manage-
ment and organizational perspectives were taken into account.
Based on Reason’s framework, Wiegmann and Shappell fur-
ther extracted systematic human error taxonomy from U.S.
Navy aviation accidents, and set up the human factors analysis
and classiﬁcation system (HFACS).1 Instead of examining how
accidents happen, Roberts adopted a positive point of view
and studied the characteristics that make high reliability
organizations (HRO) perform safely.12 Effects of legislation,
government management, and regulation were further consid-
ered in the accident map (AcciMap) approach by Svedung and
Rasmussen,13 and also in the systems-theoretic accident model
and processes (STAMP) method by Leveson.14 Recently, the
original SHELL model was modiﬁed into software–hard-
ware–environment–liveware–liveware–organization (SHEL-
LO) model by Chang and Wang through incorporating an
organizational block into the SHELL framework.15 Among
all aforementioned approaches, the HFACS is most exten-
sively used in current aviation industrial community due to
the wide coverage and high reliability rising from its inductive
nature.1,16–20
In view of the relations among accident factors, Edwards6
and Hawkins7 viewed accidents as results of inappropriate
interactions among human, aircraft, and environment in the
SHEL and SHELL model. Heinrich, in his Domino model,
considered accidents as consequences of single-channel sequen-
tial chains from society to individual.8,9 Differently, Reason
deﬁned accident mechanism as failures of safety defenses in so-
cio-technical system layers.11 Perrow, in his normal accident
theory, believed that accidents of complex and tight-coupling
systems are normal and unavoidable.21 In contrast, Roberts
considered that patterns and characteristics of safe operations
in HROs could be understood and applied to safety manage-
ment of other hazardous industries.12 Nielsen, in his cause-
consequence chart (CCC), viewed accident mechanism as
cause-consequence relations among multiple unsafe events.22
Svedung and Rasmussen further introduced control concept
into CCC and established their AcciMap approach.13 Leveson,
in her STAMP, deﬁned ‘‘control’’ as ‘‘constraint’’ and believed
that accidents are caused by failures of safety constraints in so-
cio-technical control structures.14 More recent studies by Bak-
olas and Saleh further introduced control theory like
controllability into system-perspective models.23 A systematic
review of accident causation studies can be found in a review
paper by Saleh et al.24
As for representation of accident mechanisms, the SHELL
framework and the Swiss cheese model use language-based
narration to describe accident causes and mechanisms. More-
over, these two model schematics are concise to illustrate themodel concepts, but not practicable enough for modeling the
complex, interactive evolvements of accidents.1,4,7,11 Among
graphic accident analysis approaches, the fault tree analysis
is effective for studying aircraft failures,25,26 rather than
identifying human factors.24,27 The STAMP adopts control
structure charts to describe the normal safety constraints be-
tween socio-technical levels, and represents the evolvements
of accident factors by system dynamic charts.14 Using system
dynamic charts, Marais et al.28 and Kontogiannis29 further
proposed archetypes modeling dynamic organizational behav-
iors and human processes that lead to accidents. The CCC and
AcciMap use a network structure to describe the cause-conse-
quence relationships among unsafe events of multiple socio-
technical levels.13,22 Recently, Debrincat et al. tried to integrate
the Swiss cheese framework into the AcciMap model to iden-
tify safety defense failures inside unsafe events of the AcciMap
model.30
Some Chinese scholars have applied the SHELL model31
and the HFACS32,33 to aviation accident analyses. Based on
the SHELL model, Zhang and Wang developed a multi-level
fuzzy method for aviation safety evaluation.34 Ma et al. devel-
oped a Chinese civil aviation human error analysis system
(CN-HFACS) based on multiple Chinese civil aviation acci-
dents.35 Wang Y G and Wang Y integrated business process
management into the HFACS, and developed a multidimen-
sional model for human factor analysis.36 Xiang et al. inte-
grated the triggers event result (TER) and the SHELL model
into Reason’s model, and developed an R-S-TER model for
analyzing human factors in unsafe aviation events.37 Wang J
and Yang proposed an ontology-based approach for human
factors analysis of unsafe events in air trafﬁc systems.38 Gong
et al. developed a method for hazard identiﬁcation of turbo-
fan engine digital control systems based on functional hazard
analysis (FHA).39 Recently, Sun and Zhao developed an event
classiﬁcation analysis and recommendation (ECAR) model for
human error analysis of aviation occurrence.40
A limitation we encountered when applying previous ap-
proaches to aviation accident analyses is that most aviation
accidents involve both inadequate human–aircraft–environ-
ment interactions and organizational deﬁciencies; while among
existing approaches, only the AcciMap model addresses both
aspects simultaneously, which is based on a parallel hierarchi-
cal structure with less effective description of human–aircraft–
environment interactions and interfaces between any two parts
of human–aircraft–environment integration. The second limi-
tation is that the current graphic approaches adopt entirely
subjective ways to determine unsafe events for accident
modeling,5,13,14,25,26,30,41 showing a need for identiﬁcation of
complete unsafe factors with less dependence on analysts’ skills
and experiences.5,13,30 The third concern is that the existing
approaches help identify accident factors in a reactive way,
or focus on factors that have been indicated in accidents.
Obviously, proactive approaches for identiﬁcation of potential
hazards outside the accidents and preventive control of risks
are preferred for future operations.
Starting from a new graphic approach named AcciTree for
accident modeling, this paper is dedicated to progress through
the above three limitations in aviation accident analysis and
prevention.
228 L. Gong et al.2. Integrated graphic–taxonomic approach
2.1. Structure of the AcciTree graphic model
The basic philosophy of the new graphic approach is to simul-
taneously model both inadequate human–aircraft–environ-
ment interactions which directly cause accidents, and
organizational deﬁciencies which lie in deep levels. It is obvi-
ous that the structure and form of any graphic model should
serve to describe the nature of the evolvement pattern of pro-
cesses. Two patterns emerge in modern aviation accidents, one
of which shows long-term and slow-degradation organiza-
tional evolvements, which tend to cause latent deﬁciencies in
organizational safety management, as observed in Refs.11,13,14;
while the other shows short-term and rapid reactions among
human, aircraft, and environment elements, which usually rep-
resent the direct causes of aircraft accidents, as drawn out here.
For example, if a pilot inadequately reacts to wind disturbance
in landing, a landing impact may be caused; if a pilot fails to
become aware of and react to slow descent of the aircraft, then
a controlled ﬂight into terrain (CFIT) may happen; and, pilots’
wrong reactions to system warnings that cause loss of control
of aircraft, all fall in the pattern of short-term, rapid reactions.
Multiple structures are therefore needed to model the directFig. 1 Illustration of the AcciTreeprocesses and the deep-level organizational evolvements to dis-
tinguish the pattern differences.
A two-mode structure named AcciTree is developed to meet
this need. The structure of the AcciTree model is presented in
Fig. 1, in which a Y-shaped direct process model of accident is
integrated with a multi-layer hierarchical model of organiza-
tions to describe the aviation accident mechanism graphically.
In the graphic model, ﬁrst letters of the numbers of
organizational factors – ‘‘S’’, ‘‘O’’, and ‘‘R’’ – refer to the
‘‘supervisory’’, ‘‘organizational’’, and ‘‘regulation & legisla-
tion’’ levels; second letters – ‘‘O’’ and ‘‘M’’ – refer to ‘‘opera-
tor’’ and ‘‘maintenance’’ organizations.
(1) Modeling the direct processes of accidents.
The key to model the direct process of an accident is to de-
scribe the relations among unsafe factors which directly cause
the accident. The SHELL model views causes of aviation acci-
dents as from ﬁve elements, including software, hardware,
environment, liveware, and liveware, which represent the three
areas of aircraft, environment, and human in operational sce-
narios. Adverse interactions among the three parts or between
any two of them result in accidents.4,7 Meanwhile, the inter-
faces between them are often safety–critical zones where abun-
dant errors and mismatches occur.7,14 Therefore, it is necessaryaviation accident graphic model.
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the interactions and interfaces between any two parts of the
human–aircraft–environment integration.
However, among existing approaches, the SHELL model is
good at describing what the unsafe factors and interactions
are, but lacks in practicable methods to depict the complex
process of how these unsafe factors lead to an accident through
complex interactions7; while the AcciMap model can only de-
scribe two interfaces among the three parts due to its parallel
hierarchical structure.13 To improve, we take a Y-shaped
structure with three split sectors assigned to human, aircraft,
and environment, respectively, in which
(a) Human is speciﬁed as person collective in aircraft
operations who can directly affect aircraft/ﬂight states,
typically referring to pilots, aircraft mechanics, main-
tainers, air trafﬁc controllers, etc.
(b) Aircraft is deﬁned as status of aircraft systems that
contribute to accidents, typically including mechanical
components, hardware, and software. Causes of unsafe
aircraft states involve design ﬂaws, system failures, envi-
ronment effects, maintenance errors, etc.
(c) Environment is composed of operational environment
(e.g., weather, altitude, terrain, etc.), ambient environ-
ment (e.g., vibration, lighting, temperature, toxins,
etc.), and air trafﬁc environment.
Furthermore, accidents lie in the adverse nature of interac-
tions among human, aircraft, and environment. In view of the
direct process of an accident, the interactions refer to short-
term, rapid reactions between any two parts. A reaction-based
framework is therefore proposed to represent the direct pro-
cesses of accidents. Firstly, primary events of the direct process
are deﬁned as key states or reactions of human, aircraft, and
environment that have critical roles in accident evolvement.
The primary events are composed of a starting event, accident
consequences, and most importantly, human decisions, aircraft
responses, or environment changes, as reactions to their trig-
gering events, which trigger the reactions to take place. Reac-
tion of a human/aircraft/environment element can be triggered
by multiple events; meanwhile, an event may trigger reactions
of multiple elements. These reactions are represented by reac-
tion chains, and the direct process of an accident is represented
by a spiral reaction network. The starting event of the network
is deﬁned as an initial action or state of related personnel, sys-
tem, or environment, which departs signiﬁcantly from a nor-
mal condition or leads directly to the ﬁrst anomaly in the
accident direct process. Besides the eventual accident, events
in the reaction network may also implicate other consequences
which are not shown in the accident, but deductively have
other potential side risks. These consequences also need to
be addressed in the model.
Besides the reaction pattern, other important patterns also
exist for a reaction chain to take place. We identify two pat-
terns in aviation accidents: human conditions and reaction
preconditions.
(a) Human conditions are deﬁned as critical characteristics
of human individuals, typically referring to mental and
physical states, personalities, training factors, etc.(b) Reaction preconditions are deﬁned as activities of other
individuals, or responses of systems, which should have,
but failed to cut off reaction chains.
It is necessary to distinguish these two patterns in modeling.
Both human conditions and reaction preconditions are tightly
coupled with reaction processes; therefore, they are placed at
the accident direct process level, rather than at an independent
level. In addition, time delay in reaction which may cause
problems to the network system also needs to be described.
Besides the above actual factors, it is also necessary to fur-
ther identify new safety-improve measures from the accident
processes, i.e., factors that are not covered in the accident
information, but can be used to cut off reaction chains for fu-
ture safety improvement. The safety-improve measures can be
identiﬁed from either a system design perspective or a proce-
dural perspective.
The above model describes how the direct process of unsafe
factors causes an accident, while further causes of the unsafe
factors in human, aircraft, and environment usually trace back
to organizational inﬂuences.
(2) Modeling the organizational inﬂuences.
It has been generally acknowledged that deﬁciencies in
organizational safety management are caused by unsafe
evolvements of multiple socio-technical levels ranging from
operational management to governmental regula-
tion.1,5,11,13,14,24 This hierarchical perspective has been adopted
by some models. For example, the AcciMap model uses paral-
lel levels with a causation mechanism to provide a ‘‘big-pic-
ture’’ view for description of organizational deﬁciencies
evolvements5,24,41; while the Swiss cheese model emphasizes
safety defense failures inside companies.11,30 However, avia-
tion accidents often involve causal factors of both the causa-
tion pattern and the safety defense failure pattern. Therefore,
these two frameworks are integrated to develop a hybrid hier-
archical framework, and to include unsafe factors as follows:
(a) Unsafe supervisions.
(b) Organizational inﬂuences of companies.
(c) Regulatory failures and legislation deﬁciencies.
Besides the above levels, other organizational levels can
also be added to the model to depict speciﬁc organizational
structures.
Moreover, three features of modern aviation accidents are
addressed in the AcciTree model as follows:
(A) Active/latent failure modes inside single levels of socio-
technical systems.
Reason identiﬁed the active/latent failure modes among so-
cio-technical layers.11 Here, discrepancies of active/latent fail-
ures inside single socio-technical layers are addressed to
examine their contributions to accidents. For example, inade-
quate pilot training may be attributed to two factors at the
supervisory level, which are ‘‘failing to provide adequate
training for pilots’’ and ‘‘failing to supervise pilot qualiﬁca-
tion’’. Of the two factors, the former is obviously an active
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acter, tending to result in failures in preventing the effects of
the former. Active and latent failures at the same level may
require different preventive strategies. For instance, active fail-
ures can be handled by adopting positive-perspective strategies
through safety enhancement, such as providing better training
to improve individuals’ capabilities of correct operation; and
latent failures can be addressed by adopting negative-perspec-
tive strategies through hazard prevention, such as establishing
stricter certiﬁcation procedures to prevent unqualiﬁed person-
nel from entering operation. Therefore, the active and latent
failures need to be distinguished in the model. To express the
latent failure modes inside single organizational levels, a
square bracket perpendicular to the causation chain is used,
as shown in Fig. 1.
(B) Interactions among multiple organizations.
Safe operation of modern aircrafts needs coordination of
multiple organizations, including not only the top-down pass
and bottom-up feedback of safety controls and constraints be-
tween hierarchical organizations, such as the top-down ‘‘regu-
lationﬁ company ruleﬁ pilot operation’’ safety control and
the bottom-up ‘‘accidentﬁ company correctionﬁ regulation
modiﬁcation’’ hazard feedback, but also communication and
cooperation between parallel organizations. Therefore, it is
necessary to incorporate all related interactions among all
organizations in accident analysis. As shown in Fig. 1, addi-
tional hierarchical levels are established besides the primary
organization to represent other organizations and interactions.
Typically involved organizations include operators,
maintenance organizations, manufacturers, navigation serviceFig. 2 The HFACS taproviders, weather service providers, etc. Unsafe factors iden-
tiﬁed at each organizational level are linked with their causal
factors at lower levels and consequential factors at higher lev-
els to illustrate the multi-level, multi-channel, cause-conse-
quence relations among organizational levels.
(C) Aircraft design ﬂaws that potentially lead to human
errors, and the corresponding development process.
Extensive application of digital control systems in modern
aircrafts results in more and more complex human-system
interactions. Inappropriate design may make these complex
systems prone to human errors.11 Therefore, it is necessary
to identify both design ﬂaws of the aircraft and deﬁciencies
in the development process in accident analyses. As shown in
Fig. 1, a branched structure can be used to describe the deﬁ-
ciencies in the aircraft development process.
2.2. Integration with taxonomic system
As discussed in Section 1, to reduce the discrepancies due to
entirely subjective deﬁnition of unsafe events based on per-
sonal experience in graphic approaches, the HFACS taxon-
omy,1 as shown in Fig. 2, is integrated into the AcciTree
model to help identify unsafe human factors in both direct pro-
cesses and organizational levels of accidents. Analyses of hu-
man conditions and reaction preconditions in the direct
processes of accidents should incorporate, but not be limited
to, elements of ‘‘unsafe precondition’’ level in the HFACS.
Causal factors analysis at the supervisory and organizational
levels should also incorporate, but not be limited to, elements
of ‘‘unsafe supervision’’ level and ‘‘organizational inﬂuences’’xonomy from Ref.1
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HFACS provides guidance and a minimum factors list for
unsafe factors identiﬁcation of the AcciTree model, and helps
improve the reliability of the graphic approach.
2.3. Modeling method
The procedural modeling method of AcciTree is given in
Fig. 3, in which the accident investigation information is the
input of AcciTree modeling. Beginning from the accidentFig. 3 Steps of Acconsequence, AcciTree analysis goes backward in time, until
the starting event of the accident is reached.
The ﬁrst step of modeling the direct process focuses on ac-
tual factors of the accident. Analysts need to model the actual
factors in a systematic way and as completely as possible. The
key is to be veracious to the accident information; since the
accident process is objective, it is not rigorous to use a report
and intuition to suggest additional accident factors.
Based on the reaction chains established in the ﬁrst step, the
second step further explores possible new measures that couldciTree modeling.
Fig. 4 Steps of associative hazard analysis.
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ment. Through analyzing the physical process of each reaction
chain, all possible human activities, operational procedures,
and aircraft design features that can be used to cut off the
reaction chains are identiﬁed and added to the model. When
processing the results obtained, the new safety-improve
measures should be distinguished from the actual accident
factors.
The output of the integrated analysis includes the accident
actual factors identiﬁed, the responsible parties, the corre-
sponding levels in the organizational structure, and the new
safety-improve measures identiﬁed.
3. Associative hazard analysis
While proactive approaches like FHA have been extensively
shown effective for hazard identiﬁcation in system design,25
the existing approaches in accident analysis are mainly in a
reactive way, i.e., they address unsafe factors that have been
indicated in accidents.1,11,13,14,22 To further reduce future
accidents, proactive approaches are also expected for accident
analysis. Here, an associative hazard analysis technique is
dedicated to identify unsafe factors which are outside
accidents.
Associative hazard analysis is a hazard identiﬁcation meth-
od, which guides analysts to infer or imagine similar or related
factors and corresponding potentially hazardous modes based
on unsafe factors identiﬁed from the current accident, to ex-
tend the coverage of accident analysis and form more extensive
safety-improve requirements for proactive accident prevention.
For example, if an aileron misconnection is involved in an acci-
dent, then a check on rudder misconnection – although not in-
volved in current accident, but similar to the aileron issue and
may occur in future operations – should be required for future
accident prevention.
The key of associative hazard analysis is to form a list of
related factors from current accident factors through inferen-
tial and imaginative analysis in multiple dimensions, including
causality, relationship, similarity, and multi-feature; then, po-
tential hazards of these related factors as well as possible
causes and corresponding effects can be identiﬁed to derive
proactive safety requirements.
A method of performing associative hazard analysis is pre-
sented in Fig. 4. Starting from the unsafe factors identiﬁed in
the AcciTree analysis as input, all events, conditions, and pre-
conditions at all levels of the AcciTree model could be ana-
lyzed for potential hazards.
It should be noted that the associative analysis is a further
extension of the AcciTree analysis, and the potential safety
requirements identiﬁed are incremental to basic requirements
from the AcciTree analysis.
Two accidents are illustrated as follows. One is crash of a
blended wing body (BWB) ﬂight demonstrator developed by
our research team, in view of complete information available
and effectiveness veriﬁed. The other – crash of a U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) Predator-B unmanned aircraft
(UA)42 – is used to demonstrate the application in a complex
accident scenario and to compare with analysis by Carrigan
et al. using the HFACS approach.434. Application to the BWB-2 ﬂight demonstrator crash
BWB-2 was a remotely-piloted ﬂight demonstrator with a 2-m
wingspan and a sub-scale of 1:30 to a BWB transport aircraft
design44 developed by our research team to study low-speed
ﬂight dynamics. In directional channel, the demonstrator
owned two rudders on two vertical tails mounted in the con-
necting sections of the inner and outer wings, together with
two rudders on two winglets, and a pair of split rudders in
the outer wing sections. Two ducted-fan electrical engines were
installed on the upper surface of the rear central body.
4.1. The accident process and causes
BWB-2 made its ﬁrst ﬂight in December 2008 and performed
several test ﬂights in the following months. During a regular
test ﬂight in February 2009, BWB-2 encountered a left engine
failure shortly after takeoff, coupling with signiﬁcant decrease
in rudder control power, and crashed near the runway.
Investigations showed that the cause of the engine failure
was due to maintenance negligence to fasten the fan before
ﬂight. The maintenance group checked the engine condition
by powering the engine to 1/3 maximum thrust and concluded
that the engine condition was normal. No further mechanical
check was conducted to conﬁrm that the fan was correctly
fastened. The pilot also adopted the same way in the preﬂight
check as what the maintenance group did, and failed to un-
cover this failure again.
Fig. 5 AcciTree model of the BWB-2 ﬂight demonstrator crash accident.
Table 1 Safety issues identiﬁed from the BWB-2 ﬂight demonstrator crash accident using the integrated graphic-taxonomic approach.
Category Responsible parties Safety issues
Unsafe acts Maintainers Failed to check mechanical condition of engine fan
Connected two split rudder signal wires reversely
Preconditions for unsafe acts Pilot Failed to uncover mechanical failure of engine fan in preﬂight check
Failed to uncover errors of split rudder setting in preﬂight check
Unsafe supervisions Research team Failed to provide adequate procedures
Failed to provide standard instructions
Failed to provide proper training
Organizational inﬂuences Research team Lack of eﬀective safety programs/risk management programs
Lack of clearly deﬁned objectives for maintenance check
Insuﬃcient safety culture
Insuﬃcient training program for maintainers
Insuﬃcient standard procedure for maintenance check
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Table 2 Extended safety requirements identiﬁed from the BWB-2 ﬂight demonstrator crash accident using associative hazard analysis.
Event Possible related
factors
Potential causes/
consequences
Safety requirements for aircraft
design
Safety requirements for pilot Safety requirements for
maintenance
Safety requirements for
organizational
management
Maintainers reversely
connected two split
rudder signal wires
Other signal wires Wrongly connected/
incorrect control eﬀect
(1) Design anti-error features for
signal wire connection
Check both availability and
correctness of control surfaces
according to checking criteria
Connect and check
signal wires carefully
according to instruction
(1) Establish adequate
maintenance procedure
(2) Provide clear instructions for
wire connection
(2) Set up checking
procedures and checklist
for maintenance
(3) Set up clear criteria for
control surfaces check
Maintainers failed to
check mechanical
condition of engine fan
Electrical,
mechanical
conditions of all
RPV systems
Items not covered by
standard procedures/
potential unidentiﬁed
hazards
Identify hazards and abnormal
conditions for all systems to
ensure the coverage of checklist
items
(1) Check all items in standard
checklist
(1) Check all items in
standard checklist
(1) Establish adequate
maintenance procedure
(2) Add random check using
personal experience
(2) Add random check
using personal
experience
(2) Set up checking
procedures and checklist
for maintenance
Failed to provide proper
training
Other skills required
for safe operation
Failed to provide proper
training/deﬁcient personal
skills
(1) Identify all necessary training
requirements for safety operation
Attend and master related
training courses
Attend and master
related training courses
Ensure all personnel
attending and mastering
required training courses
(2) Develop adequate training
courses for related personnel
RPV crashed in a factory
yard
Other civil facilities
or persons on
ground
Inadequate ﬂight route
planning/crash causes
injuries or property loss to
nearby residents
(1) Improve system reliability to
prevent failures
(1) Suﬃcient emergency training Not applicable (1) Provide adequate
emergency training for
all personnel
(2) Complete system safety
analysis to obtain all potential
failures and hazards
(2) Clearly understand emergency
route and corresponding
operations before every ﬂight
(2) Ensure emergency
plan established, and
understood by every one
in every ﬂight
(3) Design adequate redundancy
to provide controllability for
RPV in case of system failure
(3) Buy necessary
insurance for ﬂight test
accidents in case of
injuries(4) Develop route planning
method considering failures and
emergency conditions
2
3
4
L
.
G
o
n
g
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a
l.
Fig. 6 AcciTree model of the CBP Predator-B crash accident.
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Fig. 6 (continued)
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trol power was caused by reversely connected signal wires be-
tween the split rudders and the command transmitter. This
was also a maintenance error. The two reversed split rudders
basically neutralized control power of the conventional rudders,
making the total directional control power insufﬁcient to over-
come the unbalanced yawing moment. Moreover, in the pre-
ﬂight check, the pilot checked only the availability of rudders,
but failed to check the correctness of split rudder deﬂections.
4.2. Accident modeling and analysis
Based on the causes identiﬁed above, an AcciTree model of the
accident was constructed, as shown in Fig. 5. Safety issues
identiﬁed are summarized in Table 1.
4.3. Associative hazard analysis
By applying the associative hazard analysis technique to the
factors identiﬁed from the AcciTree model, extended safety
requirements were further achieved from the accident, as sum-
marized in Table 2.Table 3 Examples of accident factors identiﬁed from the CBP Pre
approach. Items with grey background are issues identical to the resu
Category Responsible
parties
Preconditions for
unsafe acts
Pilot
GA-ASI
Unsafe supervisions CBP
GA-ASI4.4. Corrections and results
With the safety requirements identiﬁed in Tables 1 and 2, a set
of safety programs were established in terms of personnel, pro-
cedural, supervision, and organizational levels. These safety
programs have effectively helped improve the operation safety
of ﬂight demonstrators developed later by eliminating the un-
safe factors identiﬁed.455. Application to the U.S. CBP Predator-B UA crash
On April 25, 2006, a CBP-owned Predator-B UA, which was
manufactured and operated by General Atomics Aeronautical
Systems Inc. (GA-ASI) under contract, crashed near the No-
gales International Airport. The National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) took the charge of investigation and re-
leased the investigation report in 2007.42
According to the NTSB report, probable causes of the acci-
dent were the pilot’s failure to use checklist procedures when
switching operational control from pilot payload operator
(PPO)-1 to PPO-2, which resulted in the fuel valve beingdator-B crash accident using the integrated graphic–taxonomic
lts given by Carrigan et al. using the HFACS.43
Safety issues
Lack of emergency experience
Probably fatigue
Urgent to solve problem
Lack of teamwork
Iridium link shed when engine oﬀ
PPO-1 left head-down display (HDD) froze
Auto-ignition need Iridium link signal
Engine-oﬀ aural warning identical to other warnings,
undistinguishable
Engine-oﬀ visual warning mixed with mass of other data without
priority, undistinguishable
Inappropriate energy conservation strategy design
Inadequate supervision on dispatch
Inadequate supervision on system failure correction and
maintenance
CBP government ﬂight representative (GFR) verbally authorized
unqualiﬁed pilot for ﬂight
Inadequate supervision on pilot qualiﬁcation
Untrained GFR
No speciﬁc type requirements for pilot UAS time
Inadequate dispatch
Failed to correct frequent lockup
No spare parts for UAS maintenance
No content on control switch provided in pilot training
Failed to ensure instructor present in GCS
Failed to provide adequate oversight on pilot training
Requested unqualiﬁed pilot be added to pilot list
Authorized unqualiﬁed pilot for ﬂight
Failed to provide adequate emergency training for pilot
Failed to provide adequate crew resource management (CRM)
training for pilot
Failed to provide adequate emergency training for pilot
Lost-link proﬁle (LLP) often change
Current LLP not reported to ATC
238 L. Gong et al.inadvertently shut off and a subsequent total loss of engine
power. Lack of supervision by the instructor pilot (IP) in the
ground control station (GCS), as required by the CBP, also
contributed to the accident. Other contributive factors in-
cluded system design ﬂaws, repeated while unresolved console
lockups, inadequate maintenance procedures, and the inade-
quate supervisory program by the operator, inadequate coop-
eration with air trafﬁc control (ATC). Details of the accident
can be found in Ref.42
Using information given in the NTSB report as initial in-
put, the following studies were conducted to reconstruct the
accident process and dig into the information for identiﬁcation
of more safety issues.
5.1. Accident modeling and analysis
Based on the NTSB investigation report,42 an AcciTree model
was constructed, as shown in Fig. 6. Due to the complexity of
the accident, the model was decomposed into two graphs of di-Table 4 Safety-improve measures newly identiﬁed from the CBP Pr
Categories Safety-improve m
Aircraft design Add autonomous
Add terminal are
Add automatic L
Add matching in
Add warning or l
Add automatic re
Add fault handlin
Procedure Establish validati
Table 5 Examples of extended safety requirements identiﬁed from
Event Possible related
factors
Potential causes/
consequences
Safety
aircraf
No content on
control switch
provided in pilot
training
Other important
training contents
that not included in
current training
syllabus
Deﬁcient training
syllabus/incomplete
training provided to
trainee
Develo
syllabu
with su
covera
Untrained GFR Other supervisory
personnel without
proper training
Deﬁcient training /
unable to supervise
properly
NA
Engine-oﬀ aural
warning
undistinguishable
Aural warnings for
other emergency
situations, e.g., low
altitude, fuel out,
etc.
Warning
undistinguishable/
diﬃcult for pilot to
shoot failures
Design
aural w
import
with adrect process and organizational blocks for representation. In
the organizational factor numbers, the second letters – ‘‘G’’
and ‘‘C’’ – refer to ‘‘GA-ASI’’ and ‘‘CBP’’. A total of 62 acci-
dent factors were obtained, among which 46 were newly iden-
tiﬁed by the integrated approach, as opposed to the other 16
which were identical to the results of the accident analysis by
Carrigan et al. using the HFACS.43 Moreover, eight safety-im-
prove measures including seven system design features and one
procedure possible for future safety improvement were newly
identiﬁed through the reaction chains. An abstract of the acci-
dent factors at the ‘‘preconditions for unsafe acts’’ and ‘‘unsafe
supervision’’ levels is presented in Table 3, in which the items
with grey background are those identical to Carrigan’s results,43
while the others are newly identiﬁed. The newly identiﬁed
safety-improve measures are summarized in Table 4.
It should be noted that, when evaluating results of this
study by using Carrigan’s results as control, it is necessary to
differentiate between Carrigan’s results and the HFACS
method.edator-B crash using the integrated graphic-taxonomic approach.
easures
return-to-base capability for system
a energy management (TAEM) capability for system
LP generation capability for system
dicators for 2 PPOs
ockup for unmatched switch
conﬁguration capability for PPO ﬂight graphics after control switch
g for component freeze in system design
on procedure for LLP setup
the CBP Predator-B accident using associative hazard analysis.
requirements for
t design
Safety
requirements
for pilot
Safety
requirements
for maintenance
Safety
requirements for
organizational
management
p training
s and courses
ﬃcient
ge
Not applicable
(NA)
NA (1) Ensure
related
personnel are
eﬀectively
trained
according to
syllabus
(2) Periodically
review training
syllabus for
correctness and
completeness
NA NA (1) Qualiﬁcation
check of all
supervisory
personnel
(2) Provide
proper training
if not qualiﬁed
distinctive
arning for
ant emergencies
equate priority
NA NA NA
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By applying the associative hazard analysis technique to the
factors in the AcciTree model, 17 extended safety requirements
were identiﬁed from the accident. Three examples are shown in
Table 5.
6. Conclusions
The relationship among the graphic, taxonomic, and associa-
tive parts of the integrated approach is like a triangle, with
the graphic and taxonomic parts at the bottom supporting
the incremental effort of the associative analysis.
(1) The AcciTree graphic model provides a new conception
and framework to logically describe mechanisms of mod-
ern aviation accidents, and is applicable for simultaneously
describing both organizational deﬁciencies and inadequate
human–aircraft–environment interactions of accidents.
(2) The concept of reaction chain is helpful for identifying
safety defense failures in accidents, as well as new proce-
dures, new operations, and new designs which could
enhance the robustness of human operations to errors
in the future.
(3) Introduction of the HFACS establishes a minimum fac-
tors list for AcciTree analysis. Integration of the mini-
mum factors list with the AcciTree model improves
both reliability of AcciTree analysis and logicality of
HFACS analysis, and hence effectively improves the
completeness of unsafe factors identiﬁed from accidents.
(4) The associative hazard analysis further extends accident
analysis to potentially unsafe factors outside the current
accident, i.e., factors not indicated in the accident sce-
nario but related to the accident factors. The extended
safety requirements can be used for proactive control
of future accidents.
We should also address here that this paper has the follow-
ing limitations:
(1) Although the proposed method is shown to be helpful
for identifying unsafe factors, the method – like any
other accident analysis method – still needs subjective
determinations in analyses, such as the deﬁnitions of pri-
mary events and starting events. The method is intended
to reduce, rather than remove, subjectivity in analysis,
since entire objectivity in accident analysis is impossible.
(2) This paper focuses on the key problems of factors iden-
tiﬁcation and mechanism representation in aviation acci-
dent analysis, which are both qualitative problems.
Quantitative examinations of the unsafe factors are
not covered in this paper, and will be studied in future
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